讲座题目：Strategic Inventory and Price Signaling with DemandInformation Asymmetry
地点： 深圳大学 文科楼 1400 10:20am-12:00pm
主持人：马利军 教授 管理科学系副主任
In a two-period supply chain wherein the supplier dynamically determines the wholesale prices, a retailer can strategically hold inventory to alleviate double marginalization and create a ”win-win” situation for both firms. This strategic use of inventory has been verified by many studies but with a premise that the demand information is observable to both the supplier and the retailer. However, in practice, the retailer is normally less clear about the market potential than the supplier, particularly during a new product introduction process. This paper revisits the implications of strategic inventory in a context where the supplier privately observes the demand information and can use the wholesale price as a signaling tool to convey such information to the retailer.
We show that, first, the retailer might deliberately hold inventory even under commitment contract; in addition, the retailer’s incentive to carry strategic inventory exhibits a non-monotonic relationship between the inventory level and the demand potential under dynamic contract. Second, the supplier’s payoff could decrease with the inventory cost under commitment contract while increase with the inventory cost under dynamic contract, even though there is no inventory existing under either contract scheme. Third, the supplier no longer unambiguously prefers dynamic contract to commitment contract once the inventory cost is low. In contrast, the retailer can obtain a higher payoff under dynamic contract (commitment contract) once the inventory cost is high (low). All these results are in strict contract with the existing literature and highlight the pivotal role of price signaling in the strategic use of inventory.
关旭，华中科技大学管理学博士，现任武汉大学经济与管理学院管理科学与工程系副教授。目前研究兴趣包括信息不对称环境下的供应链管理。近5年来在Production and Operations Management, Naval Research Logistic等国际权威学术发表近20篇论文。